Modeling Product Development as a System Design Game by WOODARD, C. Jason
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Information Systems School of Information Systems
6-2003
Modeling Product Development as a System
Design Game
C. Jason WOODARD
Singapore Management University, jason.woodard@olin.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons, and the Management Information Systems Commons
This Conference Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Information Systems at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Information Systems by an authorized administrator of
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
WOODARD, C. Jason. Modeling Product Development as a System Design Game. (2003). North American Association for
Computational Social and Organizational Science Conference (NAACSOS 2003). Research Collection School Of Information Systems.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/805
 
Modeling Product Development as a System Design Game 
 
C. Jason Woodard 
Harvard University 
jwoodard@hbs.edu 
 
 
Abstract 
A system design game is a model of a situation in which agents’ actions determine the 
structure of a system, which in turn affects the system’s value and the share of value that each 
agent may capture through bargaining or market competition.  This paper describes a class of 
games in which agents design interdependent products, for example software programs, which 
may be complements or substitutes for each other.  These relationships are represented by an 
object called a design structure network (DSN).  Depending on the modeler’s choice of 
allocation rules, agents may benefit from owning critical nodes in the DSN, corresponding to the 
type of architectural control enjoyed by firms like Microsoft and Intel.  Preliminary experiments 
confirm that boundedly rational agents tend to capture more value than agents that take random 
actions, and that different allocation rules yield different patterns of agent behavior and network 
structure.  Future work will use this framework to explore such phenomena as the emergence of 
technology platforms and the incentives to innovate when market power is diffuse. 
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Modeling Product Development as a System Design Game 
C. Jason Woodard 
 
Many activities in modern societies involve the development and use of large-scale systems composed of 
interdependent parts, including supply chains, communication networks, and computer software.  These systems are 
characterized by distributed ownership and control, with conflicting incentives among stakeholders but benefits to 
cooperation overall.  This paper proposes to model these situations as system design games, in which agents’ actions 
determine the structure of a system, which in turn affects the system’s value and the share of value that each agent 
may capture through bargaining or market competition. 
 
This modeling approach draws heavily on the network formation literature [e.g. Myerson, 1977; Jackson & 
Wolinsky, 1996; Jackson, 2001] which uses cooperative and non-cooperative game theory to analyze the strategic 
making and breaking of links by agents.  In system design games, we introduce a distinction between the network 
structure of a system, whose nodes are its technologically separable parts, and that of the agents who hold decision 
rights over those parts.  Here we make the simplifying assumption that agents’ interactions are mediated entirely by 
the structure of the system, setting aside other important kinds of interactions such as alliances. 
 
The goal of this research is to extend the traditional economic analysis of systems competition [e.g. Katz & 
Shapiro, 1984; Farrell & Saloner, 1992; Economides & Salop, 1992] to more complex and realistic environments.  
While analytical methods break down even for systems of modest size, agent-based simulation appears well-suited 
to the task. 
 
Design Structure Networks 
Let N be a set of agents.  These will often be firms, but could be any individuals or collectivities that participate 
in the design of the system being modeled. 
 
A design structure network (DSN) is a graph whose nodes represent “knots of structure” in a system—for 
example, physical artifacts like computers, informational artifacts like software code, or social artifacts like 
organizations.1  Edges may represent links, flows, or dependencies between nodes.  Nodes connected by edges will 
typically be complements in an economic sense.  Formally, a DSN is a tuple ),,( PLM  where M is a set of nodes, L 
is a set of directed links of the form ),( Mji ∈ , and P is a partition of M, whose members will be called positions.  
Nodes that occupy the same position will typically be economic substitutes.  Let )(gM , )(gL , and )(gP  denote 
the nodes, links, and positions of a DSN g.  Let G be the set of all possible DSNs. 
 
Given any )(gMS ⊂ , let the restricted network Sg  be the DSN formed by deleting from )(gM  and )(gP  all 
nodes except those in S, along with links not both to and from nodes in S.  Let g  be the position graph formed by 
linking any pair of positions whose members are linked in the original graph.  Let )(gPai  denote the parents of 
node i in g, and )(gChi  denote i’s children.  Let )(gCPi  denote i’s child positions.  That is, =)(gCPi  { }kik PjgChjgPP ∈∈∃∈ s.t.)()( . 
 
We need three additional objects to analyze a DSN in the context of a system design game: 
 
• A value function is a function ℜ→Gv :  that specifies the total value created by a given DSN.  It is 
analogous to the characteristic function of a cooperative game, though richer because it allows the 
value to depend not only on the set of nodes, but also on the configuration of links and positions 
                                                 
1 DSNs are inspired by Steward’s [1981] design structure matrices, but written using graph-theoretic notation 
and augmented to represent attributes of systems that are important in a multi-agent context. 
among them [Jackson, 2001].  It may not be feasible to enumerate G, so v will usually be expressed as 
an algorithm.  By convention, 0)( Ø =gv .  Let V be the set of all possible value functions. 
 
• An allocation rule is a function ||: NVGY ℜ→×  that specifies a division of value among agents for 
any value function on any network.  In contrast to Jackson [2001] and related work, the balance 
property (∑ =i i gvvgY )(),( ) is not built into the definition of an allocation rule.  In other words, 
residual value might be captured by consumers or other agents not explicitly modeled. 
 
• Operators are functions from GG →  that transform one DSN into another.  Agents’ permissible 
actions are expressed in terms of operators.  Examples include “simple” actions like adding and 
deleting individual nodes and edges, as well as “complex” actions like joining two nodes into one. 
 
The Multi-Product Systems Domain 
The above definitions are intentionally generic to allow several classes of games, or “domains,” to use the same 
formalism.  Along with concrete meanings for nodes, links, and positions, a domain is characterized by a particular 
value function and a particular set of operators available to the agents.  Consider the domain of what I call multi-
product systems, typified by commercial computer software.  Nodes are products, and links are technical or 
functional dependencies among them; )(),( gLji ∈  means that j depends on i in g.  Positions may be “product 
categories” from a customer’s perspective, or architectural “layers” from a designer’s perspective.  Operators could 
include those defined by Baldwin & Clark [2000], such as splitting, substitution, porting, and inversion. 
 
Let the function ℜ→)(:)( gMgx  assign a numerical worth to each product in g, as a measure of quality, 
performance, or customers’ willingness to pay.  Let )(gxi  denote the worth of product i in g.  A multi-product DSN 
is said to be valid if )()(, gPagPaPji jik =⇒∈  for all )(gPPk ∈ .  In other words, valid DSNs are those in which 
the products in each position have the same dependencies.  A multi-product DSN is simple if it is valid and its 
position graph is a rooted tree, i.e., g  is connected and acyclic, and there is a unique root position denoted )(gRP  
with a directed path to every other node. 
 
The following recursive function defines a value function v for simple multi-product DSNs, to which we 
confine attention in what follows: 
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In other words, the value of a product is the sum of its worth and the values of its child positions; the value of a 
position is the maximum of the values of the products it contains; and the value of the entire network is the value of 
its root position.  The summation captures the notion that linked products are complements, while the maximization 
captures the notion that products occupying the same position are substitutes. 
 
It is now easy to state the allocation rule corresponding to the Myerson / Shapley value, which was developed as 
a variation of the Shapley value for communication games [Myerson, 1977], and subsequently extended to network 
games [Jackson & Wolinsky, 1996].  We need just one more set of definitions to map nodes (i.e. products) to agents.  
Let the function NgMgo →)(:)(  associate each node in g with an agent that owns it, and let )(goi  denote the 
owner of node i in g. Denote by { }ngogMigM in =∈= )()()(  the set of nodes in g owned by agent n. 
 
The usual Myerson value for network games is defined for nodes )(gMi∈ : 
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Now we simply sum over the nodes owned by each agent to yield an allocation rule defined for agents Nn∈ : 
∑
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The Myerson / Shapley rule is only one of many we might want to apply.  Others are under active investigation 
[Jackson, 2003].  Moreover, nothing requires the use of an allocation rule derived from cooperative game theory.  It 
is equally possible to define Y as an equilibrium outcome of a non-cooperative subgame. 
 
Preliminary Experiments 
I built an agent-based model of a multi-product system design game using the University of Chicago’s RePast 
simulation toolkit (Figure 1).  Shading indicates ownership, overlapped boxes indicate nodes that occupy the same 
position, and numbers in boxes indicate the worth of each node.  Size is also significant; this will be discussed in a 
longer version of the paper.  Agents were given two families of operators: splitting, i.e., dividing a product into sub-
products, thus creating new positions, and substitution, i.e., adding a competing product to an existing position. 
 
An immediate issue that arose is that the strategy space of the agents grows exponentially with the size of the 
network.  This is a feature of real life, and both real and computational agents must find ways to effectively prune 
the set of actions they consider.  Given the vast and growing literature on bounded rationality, I believe this will be a 
fruitful area for further research.  As a first cut, I implemented two kinds of agents: “Myopic” ones that look one 
move ahead and choose the action with the highest expected payoff, and “Random” ones that choose an action at 
random.  Figure 2 confirms that Myopic agents tend to obtain higher payoffs than Random ones.  The result is not 
surprising, but the variance is large (the bars indicate standard errors) and the Myopic agents’ advantage diminishes 
as their number grows—clearly there is a lot of room for improvement! 
 
A second issue is that the choice of value function and allocation rule embeds strong assumptions about 
consumer behavior and the nature of competition in the markets for the agents’ products.  For example, the use of 
the value function defined above with the Myerson / Shapley allocation rule is consistent with the story that there are 
many consumers with identical preferences, each able to “mix and match” products to assemble the highest-valued 
system possible, then to negotiate with product suppliers over price.  Another implication is that the owner of a 
product on which others depend wields a form of market power over owners of dependent products, because of the 
way the Myerson value is constructed.  A possible story here is that the agent “on top” could choose not to sell its 
product unless it were paid more, rendering the dependent products worthless.  Again, more research is required to 
understand these assumptions more systematically.  In particular, it would be useful to develop a catalog of value 
functions and allocation rules, and use empirical evidence to discern which may be appropriate under what 
circumstances.  In the meantime, a simple experiment (Figure 3) shows one feature of agent behavior and network 
structure that is sensitive to the choice of allocation rule: when the Myerson / Shapley value is used, in contrast to a 
rule called “Simple” that awards no premium for architectural control, Myopic agents tend to build more frequently 
on products they already own—presumably to mitigate the risks of hold-up by owners of parent products. 
 
Future Work 
Needless to say, this research is at an early stage and there is much to be done.  After solidifying the modeling 
framework, it would be interesting to explore phenomena, such as the emergence of technology platforms, which 
would be well served by the direct representation of system architecture this approach affords. More generally, these 
kinds of models could shed light on the conflicting incentives of agents engaged in building complex systems— 
especially the tension between proprietary control, which tends to enhance individual agents’ ability to capture 
value, and practices like open standardization that tend to “grow the pie” for all participants. 
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Figure 1: A Design Structure Network in RePast 
Figures 2 & 3: Preliminary Experimental Results 
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